Abstract
This Article challenges the logic of limiting benefits in the Code to married debtors and argues that awarding benefits based on marital status reduces the efficacy of the Code as marriage rates continue to decline in the United States. This Article also explores how the availability of these benefits is dictated by individual states' definitions of marriage and determination of which of their citizens can legally marry. Thus, the reach and force of the Code is further limited by the discrepancy between individual states' definitions of marriage and DOMA. Thus, the steady decline in marriage rates and the continued rise in nontraditional familial units leave the Code out of step with American society.
Recommended Citation
Tiffany R. Harper,
Gelding the Lily: How the Bankruptcy Code's Promotion of Marriage Leaves It Impotent,
28
Emory Bankr. Dev. J.
31
(2011).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol28/iss1/6