Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

Volume 2Issue 1
Essays

International Maritime Organization’s Regulation of Sulfur Emission

Jennifer M. Greene | 2 Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev. 41 (2015)

The International Maritime Organization has recently set forth strict sulfur emission limitations to help curb environmental pollution across the seas. The regulation is ideal for reducing the environmental impact of international maritime shipping carriers. While the regulation is ideal on its face, in practice, the enforcement authority of the International Maritime Organization and the current compliance by carriers is limited. The cost-benefit analysis between environmental compliance and non-compliance exposes the conflicting incentives. This article presents the difficulties of enforcing this new regulation and offers insight and alternatives for both carriers the International Maritime Organization.

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Corporate Lawlessness: An Era of Corporate Irresponsibility May Be Coming to a Close

Kelsey G. Spillers | 2 Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev. 55 (2015)

Corporations currently benefit from an “impunity gap” in international law, a loophole that both empowers them to commit crimes and shields them from punishment. International tribunals created this loophole by limiting criminal liability to “natural persons,” thereby excluding corporations, which are classified as “legal persons.” Without the possibility of retribution, these entities are free to do as they please. By offering their considerable resources and leverage to individuals, corporations provide the means for these “natural persons” to commit crimes of a magnitude far greater than would otherwise be possible.

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The Dual-Class Share Structure

Olivia Wang | 2 Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev. 63 (2015)

Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., a company adopting a dual-class share structure, turned to NYSE as a result of the policy that allows companies with a share structure different than the normal “one share one vote” structure. Not every stock market in the world adopts the same policy; the availability of the dual-class share structure in the US stock market became an attraction for companies with the ambition to go public, among which are high-tech companies such as Google and Facebook. However, dual-class share structure is disfavored by investors. They fear that they would be underrepresented and given insufficient protection in the publically-traded companies. This article seeks to rebut some of the worthy goals of dual-class share structure, such as “allowing shareholders to more easily and efficiently monitor performance of directors,” and points out the danger that such structure may eliminate market checks on managerial misconduct.

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