Runnable, Ruinable Repo and the Great Recession: A Panic-Proofing Approach to Financial Regulation

Authors

Aaron Metviner

Abstract

This Paper argues for a sort of Gorton/Ricks hybrid approach to panic-proofing, whereby the federal government (1) insures the very-short-term repo obligations of the SIFIs (while also ensuring the high-quality of the collateral under those repo agreements) and (2) limits the exposure levels of the SIFIs to all other forms of uninsured runnable debt.

Recommended Citation

Aaron Metviner, Runnable, Ruinable Repo and the Great Recession: A Panic-Proofing Approach to Financial Regulation, 5 Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev. 85 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar/vol5/iss2/3