Emory Law Journal

Too Far From Home: Why Daimler’s “At Home” Standard Does Not Apply to Personal Jurisdiction Challenges in Anti-Terrorism Act Cases
Ariel Winawer Executive Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal; J.D., Emory University School of Law (2017); B.A., University of California, Los Angeles (2010). I am truly grateful to my faculty advisor, Professor Richard D. Freer, for his guidance and encouragement throughout the comment writing process. I would also like to thank the members of the Emory Law Journal Executive Board, particularly Molly Haren and Nathan North, for their edits and feedback. Finally, I thank my parents, Lloyd and Marcey Winawer, for their unyielding support which has always made it easy to be close to home.

Abstract

The Anti-Terrorism Act is a federal statute enacted to help grant recourse to United States plaintiffs who have lost family members in international acts of terrorism. Under the statute, plaintiffs may file civil claims against organizations that directly engage in, or aid and abet, terrorism. A recent handful of Anti-Terrorism Act cases have been brought in federal district court against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority by plaintiffs whose family members were killed in terrorist attacks that occurred in Israel. A split between two federal district courts exists regarding whether personal jurisdiction over both the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority is constitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman.

This Comment explores the application of personal jurisdiction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and argues that Daimler should not be applied to cases brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act. This Comment advocates for a simple solution to the lower courts’ split whereby personal jurisdiction over the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority is assessed under the federal due process standards of the Fifth Amendment, rather than under those of the Fourteenth Amendment. A more traditional assessment under Fifth Amendment standards would quash concerns about the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over these two entities and help preserve federal policy behind the Anti-Terrorism Act’s enactment.

Introduction

Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 118 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339 (2012). to provide a civil cause of action for the families of United States citizens injured or killed in acts of international terrorism. 2See id. § 2333 (“Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”); see also Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (D. Utah 2006) (“The Anti-Terrorism Act . . . evinces Congress’s intent ‘to codify general common law tort principles and to extend civil liability for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort law.’” (quoting Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002))).

The legislative history of the ATA reveals that Congress intended to hold terrorists accountable where it hurts them most: their funds. 3136 Cong. Rec. 26717 (1990); Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 101st Cong. 133 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Professor Wendy Collins Perdue). The ATA was meant to deter terrorists, and those who aid and abet terrorism, from carrying out attacks on Americans by chipping away at terrorism’s financial support in the United States. 4See Hearing, supra note 3, at 78–79 (testimony of Joseph A. Morris).

Recently, a number of plaintiffs whose family members were killed in terrorist attacks abroad filed suit under the ATA against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). 5See, e.g., Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-7034 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-7024 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-7025 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2015); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014); Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-3151 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2014). The plaintiffs in these cases asserted civil claims against the PLO or the PA on behalf of family members killed, or seriously injured, as a result of terrorist attacks in Israel. In these cases, the PLO and the PA moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaints on the grounds that federal courts now lack general jurisdiction over them in light of Daimler AG v. Bauman. 6Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014). Two federal district courts are split on the issue of whether courts now lack personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA in light of Daimler. 7Compare Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (holding that jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA was not proper under Daimler), with Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (holding that jurisdiction was proper under Daimler). Except in one case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has granted the PLO and the PA’s motions for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction after Daimler. 8See Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 8187951, at *1, *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying defendant’s challenge to the court’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction because defendants failed to assert the defense when it first became available in 2011 after Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)). Compare Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250, Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 25, and Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 49 (cases holding that personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA was no longer constitutional, per Daimler), with Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (holding that defendants waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to assert it in their original motion to dismiss). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, however, has denied such motions for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 9See, e.g., Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2. This Comment argues that Daimler does not control cases brought under the ATA for two primary reasons. 10This Comment expresses no opinion on the plaintiffs’ factual arguments in these cases. It solely identifies and discusses a personal jurisdiction split among federal district courts. First, the majority in Daimler only provided two examples of where a defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction: if the defendant is (1) an individual or (2) a corporation. 11Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see infra Part IV.A.Daimler makes no mention of where a non-sovereign government entity may be subject to general jurisdiction. 12See infra Part IV.A; see also Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 44 (describing the PA as a non-sovereign government entity). Secondly, and perhaps more convincingly, the test Daimler articulates for assessing general jurisdiction should not apply to cases in which the plaintiff’s claims are not state-specific. 13See infra Part IV.B. Even though Daimler was a federal question case brought in federal court, the Supreme Court assessed whether due process was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 14Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (“The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint.” (emphasis added)).Daimler was predicated on a state-specific claim, namely, whether a defendant had such “continuous and systematic” affiliations with the state of California so as to render it essentially “at home” in California. 15Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). In other words, Daimler served to answer the question of whether a state could exercise general jurisdiction based on a nonresident’s contacts with the state. 16See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish For: Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 Emory L. J. Online 2001, 2002 (2014). That is not the relevant inquiry facing the federal courts in recent cases against the PLO and the PA. 17The relevant inquiry faced by both the D.C. District Court and the Southern District of New York was whether defendants PLO and PA had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 244 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 43; Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).

This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses the personal jurisdiction standard under the Fourteenth Amendment and two Supreme Court cases that limited the general jurisdiction standard: Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler. Part I also analyzes how courts assess due process under the Fifth Amendment and argues the assessment should differ from that of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II discusses both the statutory and constitutional bases for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under the ATA. Part II also details how several ATA cases with jurisdictional questions were decided pre-Daimler. Part III introduces several recent cases brought in federal court under the ATA. The defendants in these cases, the PLO and the PA, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Daimler. The federal district courts are split on the issue of whether to grant these motions. Part IV argues these motions should be denied for four reasons. First, Daimler does not apply to these cases because it does not define how personal jurisdiction is assessed for non-sovereign government entities. Second, Daimler considers personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment on a state-specific claim while the cases brought under the ATA are not based on state-specific claims. 18See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Third, a due process analysis under Daimler conflates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Finally, applying a due process analysis under Daimler to cases brought under the ATA will neither honor nor uphold the federal policy that was instrumental in the ATA’s enactment.

I. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments

This Part explores how the Supreme Court has most recently assessed personal jurisdiction under both the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Section A describes the Fourteenth Amendment analysis and the limiting effects two recent cases had on general jurisdiction. Section B analyzes how personal jurisdiction is commonly assessed under the Fifth Amendment, despite a dearth of existing case law. 19See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 14–16 (1987) (highlighting the failure of the federal courts to close the gap in this area of the law). Section B also argues for a broader interpretation of personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment with fewer restrictions than those felt by the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 20See Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455, 456 (2004). Specifically, it asserts the idea that personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the Fifth Amendment should be constitutional on the basis of a defendant’s aggregate contacts with the United States. 21See id. (arguing that jurisdiction over foreign defendants under the Fifth Amendment should be constitutional solely on the basis of effects in the United States, without a requirement of “purposeful availment”).

Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate a claim against a person. 22Personal Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). There are two commonly referred to types of personal jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. 23See Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2003 (noting that International Shoe first authorized these forms of personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts). Specific jurisdiction refers to cases in which there is a connection between a cause of action in a particular state and a defendant’s contacts or activities within that state. 24Id. For example, if a Nevada corn supplier breached an agreement to deliver corn to a buyer in Colorado, such breach would give Colorado courts specific jurisdiction over that Nevada corn supplier. On the other hand, general jurisdiction refers to situations in which there is not a connection between a cause of action in a particular state and a defendant’s contacts or activities within that state. 25See Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure § 2.4 (3d ed. 2012). For example, say a non-resident of Nevada sues a foreign corporation in Nevada for securities fraud. Although that foreign corporation conducts business in Nevada, the cause of action did not arise in Nevada, nor does it relate to the corporation’s activities there. 26See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (holding that a Philippine mining corporation was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio where it carried on “a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business”). In this circumstance, a court may find general jurisdiction over that foreign corporation proper in Nevada.

To assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, whether specific or general, a plaintiff must satisfy both a statutory and a constitutional requirement. 27See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“[B]efore a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice to the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There also must be a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of summons.”). For an analytical framework for assessing personal jurisdiction, see Freer, supra note 25, at § 2.6. The statutory requirement is usually satisfied by a state’s long-arm statute or a federal long-arm statute. 28See Joseph W. Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples and Explanations 25−26 (6th ed. 2008) (“The due process clause does not actually confer any jurisdiction on state courts; it only defines the outer bounds of permissible jurisdictional power. . . . It is up to the legislature of each state to actually grant the power . . . through jurisdictional statutes.”); Luther L. McDougal, III, Robert L. Felix & Ralph U. Whitten, American Conflicts Law 75 (5th ed. 2001) (“[I]f process is to be constructively served outside a state on a defendant, there must be special statutory authorization for the service.”). Long-arm statutes are created by the legislature and give courts power to assert jurisdiction over a defendant. 29Glannon, supra note 28, at 25. In cases where defendants violate federal law and do not consent to the jurisdiction of any state but have sufficient contacts with the United States for federal courts to apply federal law, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) may be used as the statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction over defendants. 30See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (describing the specific problem Rule 4(k)(2) was meant to address).

The constitutional requirement for satisfying personal jurisdiction derives from the Due Process Clause and is the subject of vast case law. 31See generally 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.1 (4th ed. 2015). The Due Process Clause “protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful power.” 32J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011). The Supreme Court has spoken about Fourteenth Amendment Due Process limitations on personal jurisdiction, but has provided less guidance with respect to those of the Fifth Amendment. 33See Perdue, supra note 20, at 456 (“The Supreme Court has never squarely considered what limits the Fifth Amendment imposes on assertions of personal jurisdiction in federal court.”); see also Welkowitz, supra note 19, at 1–2 (remarking on the lack of federal case law on this topic). Although the pertinent language of the two amendments is nearly identical, 34The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. With emphasis on the states, the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. commentators have mixed opinions about whether the limits imposed on the people by the Fifth Amendment are analogous to those imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 35Compare Perdue, supra note 20, at 457 (arguing that the limits imposed by the Fifth Amendment are not comparable to those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment), with Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing the fact that the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases have not interpreted the Fifth Amendment is of little significance because the Court has interpreted the two clauses as imposing similar restraints). This Comment argues that the limits imposed under each are, in fact, different. 36Wright, Miller & Steinman, supra note 31, at § 1068.1, at 699 (“When a federal court adjudicates a federal question claim, it exercises the sovereign power of the United States and no federalism problem is presented. The Fourteenth Amendment function of protecting the several states’ status as coequal sovereigns seemingly ought to be of no relevance to the parallel analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).

A. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment acts to ensure a defendant is not subject to suit in a state in which he does not have sufficient minimum contacts or has not conducted substantial activity. 37See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 Wash. U. L.Q. 1291, 1292 (1983). At its core, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is a doctrine meant to uphold state sovereignty and serve as a check on the courts of each state. 38Perdue, supra note 20, at 457. The Court in Pennoyer v. Neff first articulated the importance of state sovereignty to a personal jurisdiction analysis. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1877).

1. Pre-Goodyear and Daimler Standard

The seminal Supreme Court case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington 39326 U.S. 310 (1945). articulated the modern test for evaluating specific jurisdiction. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, specific jurisdiction is permitted over a defendant if two conditions are met. 40Id. at 320. First, the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the state in which he is being sued. 41Id. Second, subjecting the defendant to litigation in that state must not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 42Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In applying the standard for general jurisdiction, courts have generally applied the test set forth in International Shoe but focused more on whether a defendant’s activities in the relevant state are “continuous and systematic.” 43Id. at 317. Although International Shoe was a case of specific jurisdiction, its framework has been applied to both specific and general jurisdiction cases. Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2003. In the forty years after International Shoe, the Court only decided two general jurisdiction cases and applied the same test it had used to decide cases of specific jurisdiction (i.e. “continuous and systematic contacts”). In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., the Court found the defendant had carried out “continuous and systematic” business activities in the forum state and was thus subject to jurisdiction in that state. 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952). In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Court held one trip taken to the forum state by an executive officer did not constitute “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state and could not support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant. 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). General jurisdiction is commonly thought of as a balance between the nature of a defendant’s contacts in the forum and the fairness of subjecting the defendant to suit in the forum. 44Welkowitz, supra note 19, at 3; Walter H. Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International Terrorism, 3 San Diego Int’l L.J. 1, 7 (2002) (discussing how the fairness factors may weigh in favor of courts asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants).

Thirty-five years after International Shoe, the Court revisited another Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction question. 45See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980) (determining whether a corporate automobile wholesaler and retailer defendant had such minimum contacts with the state of Oklahoma so as to be subject to suit in Oklahoma). In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, the Court reinforced how strongly the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates among the states. 46Id. at 294 (“[E]ven if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”). World-Wide Volkswagen involved a tragic car explosion that occurred in Oklahoma as the plaintiffs drove through the state on their way to Arizona. Id. at 288. The plaintiffs sued the car’s wholesaler and retailer in Oklahoma. Id. The Court held that jurisdiction over the defendants in Oklahoma was improper because the defendants did not conduct activity in Oklahoma and did not purposefully avail themselves of any privileges or benefits of Oklahoma law. Id. at 299. The Court reiterated that the minimum contacts test set forth in International Shoe “ensure[s] that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” 47Id. at 291–92. The Court then added an additional consideration to the International Shoe minimum contacts test. 48Id. at 297. Not only must a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the state and demonstrate “continuous and systematic” activity within the state, but he must also “purposefully avail” himself of that state. 49Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Additionally, jurisdiction over a defendant must not “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 50Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen provided five factors to help evaluate whether asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant is fair: (1) “the burden on the defendant”; (2) “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute”; (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief”; (4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (5) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Freer, supra note 25, at § 2.4, at 88 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). The phrase “purposeful availment” requires that a defendant purposefully engage in conduct directed towards the residents of the state in which the lawsuit is filed. 51World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). Without this conduct, a defendant cannot be subject to litigation in that state. 52Id. at 297 (“The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws’ gives a degree of predictability to the legal system . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011). For example, a perfume company based in New York that markets and sells its fragrances all over the United States cannot necessarily be sued in Maine by a Maine resident who had an adverse reaction to a fragrance. In this hypothetical scenario, a perfume company that does nothing to specifically target Maine or those who live there cannot be subject to suit in Maine. With the addition of World-World Volkswagen to the Court’s specific jurisdiction cache, only activities that are purposefully directed at or within a particular state can justify a sovereign state’s exercise of power over a resident of another sovereign state. 53See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481–82 (1985) (holding that the limits on state power under the Fourteenth Amendment are designed to protect individuals by providing them with fair notice that their activities will render them liable to suit in a particular forum).

2. Goodyear and Daimler

Most recently, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of when a nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction in a particular state with two cases: Goodyear and Daimler. These cases could have simplified the International Shoe minimum contacts analysis. 54For a discussion on Goodyear and Daimler’s shortcomings, see Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2005–15. In reality, Goodyear and Daimler had the opposite effect. 55Id. at 2002. In Goodyear, the Court answered the question of whether foreign subsidiaries of a United States corporation could be sued in state court on claims unrelated to any in-state activity. 56Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011). The case involved two boys from North Carolina who were killed in a bus accident in France, resulting from a defective tire manufactured abroad in one of Goodyear’s foreign subsidiary plants. 57 Id. The parents of the boys sued Goodyear and its subsidiary in North Carolina state court. 58Id. Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that North Carolina courts had general jurisdiction over Goodyear’s subsidiary, whose tires had reached the State through “the stream of commerce.” 59Id. at 919–20 (citations omitted). In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court held that Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries were in no sense “at home” in North Carolina. 60Id. at 929 (emphasis added). Their connections to North Carolina “[fell] far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.” 61Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). Thus, with Goodyear, the Court articulated a specific standard for asserting general jurisdiction over a defendant—for a defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular area, the defendant must be “at home” in that area. 62Id. at 919.

Three years later in Daimler, the Court again addressed an issue of general jurisdiction. 63Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). The case involved Argentinian residents who brought suit against Daimler, a German corporation, in California, alleging criminal activity by the corporation’s Argentinian subsidiary. 64Id. at 748. The plaintiffs filed suit in California, stating that jurisdiction was based on the California contacts of Daimler’s American subsidiary. 65Id. Although the Ninth Circuit determined that it had general jurisdiction over the defendants in California, the Supreme Court reversed that holding. The Court concluded that general jurisdiction was not proper because Daimler could not be subject to suit in California for the alleged criminal activity of a foreign subsidiary that took place abroad. 66 Id. at 762.

Although the case was filed in federal court, the issue to which the Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preclude[d] the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler.” 67Id. at 751 (emphasis added). The issue in Daimler was state-specific, requiring the Court to determine whether jurisdiction over the corporation was constitutional in California. 68Id.

The Court concluded that due process did not permit the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler in California because Daimler was not “at home” in California. 69Id. The Court relied upon its instruction in Goodyear in determining Daimler was not “at home” in California. Id. Thus, with Goodyear and Daimler, the Court narrowed the scope of when general jurisdiction is constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70See id. at 761–62. The cases redefined “continuous and systematic” ties with the forum state to mean “at home” in the forum state. 71Id. at 762 n.20 (“General jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”). See Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2005. Professors Arthur and Freer also point out how Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Daimler, utterly disregards the “fairness” factors of International Shoe, indicating the “fairness factors” have nothing to do with general jurisdiction. Id. at 2004–05.

To aid future courts’ analysis, Daimler provided two guiding examples of where a defendant is “at home”: (1) individuals are “at home” where domiciled 72Domicile is defined as “[t]he place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as . . . [his] true, fixed, principal, and permanent home . . . .” Domicile, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 22. ; and (2) corporations are “at home” where incorporated and where they conduct their principal place of business. 73Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (citations omitted). Despite these guidelines, the Court provided no further insight for other entities, such as non-sovereign government entities, which are neither individuals nor corporations. 74See Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014), (“Defendants by their own admission are not foreign corporations and therefore are not subject to the traditional analysis of determining a defendant’s place of incorporation or principal place of business.”); Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2005.

B. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fifth Amendment

Personal jurisdiction over a defendant in federal court is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 75Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 100 (1987). The Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis is less clear than the Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 76See Perdue, supra note 20, at 460 n.34 (“The Supreme Court has never decided what limits the Fifth Amendment might impose with respect to personal jurisdiction.”). Several commentators maintain the position that Fifth Amendment Due Process standards should be broader than Fourteenth Amendment Due Process standards. 77See Marilyn J. Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 285, 313–14; Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 967, 986 (1961). Courts take varying positions with respect to the scope of United States sovereignty in a jurisdictional context. 78Compare Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 291 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding personal jurisdiction over West German manufacturer could not be founded on his aggregated contacts with United States), with Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (“[T]he appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court where the suit is based upon a federally created right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth Amendment.”) . For a comprehensive overview on whether the scope of United States judicial authority is parallel to, or broader than, the scope of individual state authority, see generally Perdue, supra note 20. While some courts believe that the analysis for constitutional due process under the Fifth Amendment should be the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment, 79See, e.g., Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The proper inquiry is not . . . whether a defendant’s contacts ‘in the aggregate are extensive.’” (citation omitted)); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to aggregate national contacts); Superior Coal Co v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418–20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (rejecting a national contacts theory). others have found that due process under the Fifth Amendment permits a “national contacts” approach to personal jurisdiction. 80See, e.g., Eng’g Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (identifying that a foreign defendant can rarely prefer one district over another); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) (holding that the Utah District Court could consider the aggregate presence of the defendant alien’s business in the United States as a whole). Under a national contacts approach to personal jurisdiction, a defendant’s minimum contacts with the state in which he is being sued are still assessed under the International Shoe framework, but the inquiry is not limited to the contacts the defendant has in the state where the district court sits. 81Harvard Law Review Assoc., Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 470, 475 (1981). This is so because the fairness inquiry set forth in International Shoe is a reflection on the “territorial limitations on the power of an individual state.” 82Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (1985); cf. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”). The notion of minimum contacts originated from cases that examined the jurisdictional reach of the individual states. 83Wright, Miller & Steinman, supra note 31, at § 1068.1, at 694. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis, which seeks to prevent encroachment by one state upon the sovereignty of another, should, by implication, have no bearing on the adjudication of a federal claim in federal court. 84Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).

The Supreme Court has twice failed to answer whether a federal court can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on an aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the nation, rather than its contacts with the state in which the federal court sits. 85Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (the Court failed to decide a Fifth Amendment issue); Omni Capital Int’l. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987). In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 86480 U.S. 102 (1987). the Court examined whether personal jurisdiction in California over a Japanese company was proper based on a valve stem manufactured in Japan that allegedly malfunctioned in California, causing a motorcycle crash and injuring the plaintiff. 87Id. at 105–06. The Court analyzed whether due process over Asahi was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 88Id. at 108. While the Court remained divided on the question of whether the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied by the stream of commerce theory articulated by the California Supreme Court, eight Justices agreed that asserting jurisdiction over Asahi would violate fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 116. The Court concluded that it was not. 89Id. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, but did not opine whether a foreign company’s contacts with the United States could be aggregated nationwide for jurisdictional purposes. 90Id. at 113 n.* (“We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.”). While the Court concluded that Asahi did not maintain sufficient minimum contacts with the state of California, perhaps an examination of the company’s contacts nationwide would have rendered personal jurisdiction over Asahi in federal court proper. In Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., the plaintiffs brought a case under a federal statute asserting that “a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole.” 91Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987). For reasons left unanswered, the Court declined to decide that particular issue. 92Id. (“‘We have no occasion’ to consider the constitutional issues raised by this theory.” (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.*)).

Despite a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, several courts and scholars have asserted that a due process analysis should be more flexible under the Fifth Amendment than under the Fourteenth Amendment. 93See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 Ind. L.J. 1, 34 (1982) (“[A]s to foreign affairs . . . there are acknowledged ‘differences between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs’” (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936))); Perdue, supra note 20, at 460–61 (noting that in the international law context, the burdens and state interest should be analyzed differently than in the interstate context). They maintain that a more flexible assessment is warranted because there is no overarching concern with state sovereignty under the Fifth Amendment. 94J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite relationship with the United States Government but not with the government of an individual State. That would be an exceptional case[] . . . .”); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1985); Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co, 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984). With respect to international litigation, this Comment asserts that a due process analysis should be even more flexible under the Fifth Amendment because the interests of a foreign defendant need to be balanced with the interests of the United States itself. 95See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–14 (holding that in order to determine whether jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable under the Fifth Amendment, the Court must weigh the burden on the defendant in litigating in the forum, the federal interest in the litigation, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief); Perdue, supra note 20, at 468–70. Particularly in cases where Congress has enacted a federal statute that allows the United States to assert jurisdiction over a defendant, federal policy behind the statute’s enactment should be given consideration in a due process analysis. 96Perdue, supra note 20, at 469 (“[S]tatute[s] should be afforded substantial weight as a legislative articulation of federal social policy.” (quoting Wright, Miller & Steinman, supra note 31, at § 1068.1, at 625)).

II. Asserting Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants Under the ATA

As discussed in Part I, a court must have both a statutory and a constitutional basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 97See supra Part I. Victims of international terrorism often have difficulty securing personal jurisdiction over the organizations that contributed to their loss. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) 98See supra Part I (discussing the implication of Rule 4(k)(2)). helps these plaintiffs assert a statutory basis for jurisdiction. 99See Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 239 (D.R.I. 2004) (quoting Hearing, supra note 3, (testimony of Joseph A. Morris)).

A. Statutory Basis

The statutory basis for foreign defendants—when they are outside the reach of a federal long-arm provision or a state long-arm statute—is granted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). 100Fed. R. Civ. P 4(k)(2) (“Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”). Rule 4(k)(2) requires the plaintiff asserting jurisdiction over a defendant to satisfy three elements: (1) the claim arises under federal law; (2) no state court of general jurisdiction has personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (3) the federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is “consistent with the Constitution or other federal law.” 101Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 92 (D.R.I. 2001) (first citing United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 1999); then citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)). Plaintiffs who bring claims under the ATA must satisfy each of these three requirements. 102Federal Rule 4(k)(2) “fill[s] a gap in the enforcement of federal law for courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants with sufficient contacts with the United States generally, but insufficient contacts with any one state in particular.” Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note). Thus, Rule 4(k)(2) serves as a statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction in federal court over foreign defendants that have allegedly committed terrorist attacks abroad. 103Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Each requirement is addressed in turn.

1. Claim Arising Under Federal Law

First, Federal Rule 4(k)(2) requires that the plaintiff’s claim arise under federal law. 104Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). The ATA is a federal law that grants plaintiffs a civil cause of action for bringing tort claims against terrorists or entities affiliated with terrorism. 10518 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012). Thus, United States plaintiffs who bring claims under the ATA against foreign defendants satisfy the first requirement of Federal Rule 4(k)(2).

2. No State Court Has Jurisdiction

Second, Federal Rule 4(k)(2) requires that there be no state in which a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction constitutionally. 106Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Courts vary regarding which party has the burden of proof on this issue. 107See Freer supra note 25, at 157 & nn.77–78. Some courts require the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state. Id. The majority of courts, however, shift the burden to the defendant and require the defendant to identify any state in which he would be subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. Some federal circuits place this burden on the defendant, meaning that a defendant who contends he cannot be subject to suit in a particular state and does not concede to jurisdiction in another state may be statutorily subjected to Rule 4(k)(2) in federal court. 108See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11. The D.C. Circuit adopted the view employed by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that “so long as a defendant does not concede to jurisdiction in another state, a court may use 4(k)(2) to confer jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 651 (5th Cir. 2004)). In recent cases brought against the PLO and the PA in federal district court, neither the PLO nor the PA conceded to jurisdiction in any state. 109See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2015); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2014); Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014). Thus, plaintiffs who brought claims under the ATA satisfied the second requirement of Federal Rule 4(k)(2).

3. Consistent with the Constitution or Other Federal Law

Third, Federal Rule 4(k)(2) requires that the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution or other federal law. Courts make this determination based on the defendant’s aggregate contacts with the United States. 110See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11 (“Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution turns on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole to satisfy due process.”). An aggregate contacts analysis should thereby apply when due process is assessed under the Fifth Amendment. 111Id. Thus, in order to satisfy Fifth Amendment Due Process requirements, plaintiffs in ATA cases only need to show that defendants have minimum contacts with the United States, rather than any one particular state. 112In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

In addition to finding a statutory basis, a court must also find a constitutional basis for asserting jurisdiction over a defendant. 113See supra Part I.

B. Constitutional Basis

In federal question cases involving foreign defendants, district courts should assess the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 114See, e.g., Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11; Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 248 (D.R.I. 2004). Under this clause, courts should determine whether jurisdiction is proper based on a foreign defendant’s aggregate contacts with the United States. 115E.g., Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11 (“Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is ‘consistent with the Constitution’ for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2) depends on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 87. This Comment argues that constitutional authority derived from the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause should be broader than that derived from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. This is so because the Fifth Amendment is rooted in federal, not state, sovereign power. 116See United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306 (1914) (holding that the constitutional barriers that border the states and keep them from infringing on the rights of other states do not apply to the United States government, which has broader powers by virtue of its sovereignty); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 Hastings L.J. 799, 818 (1988) (“Constitutional authority is premised on sovereign territorial power over the defendant through his contacts with the nation.”).

C. Previous ATA Cases

Courts have examined previous claims under the ATA (asserted against defendants other than the PLO and the PA) by assessing a defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole. 117E.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2010); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1334–36 (2006); In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 806–07. Doing so has afforded American plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate their cases in the United States. For example, in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, family members of an American citizen killed in a suicide bombing in Israel brought an action under the ATA against a Chinese bank alleged to have executed wire money transfers for the terrorist organization responsible for the bombing. 118755 F. Supp. 2d at 18. The court found general jurisdiction over the bank constitutional on the basis that the bank did business with and held assets in the United States. 119Id. at 33 (“The alleged jurisdictional fact that BOC does extensive business in the United States through its own branches supports a finding of general personal jurisdiction.”). Similarly, in Morris v. Khadr, an American soldier wounded in Afghanistan, along with the heirs of a soldier killed in the same attack, sued a member of al Qaeda under the ATA. 120Morris, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. The Utah District Court held that general personal jurisdiction over the defendant was constitutional because he had the requisite minimum contacts with the United States. 121Id. at 1335−36 (“In terrorism cases, courts have employed the ‘effects doctrine’ to establish the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, ‘jurisdiction may attach if the defendant’s conduct is aimed at or has an effect in the forum.’” (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998))). Lastly, in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, family members, heirs, and insurance carriers of the victims lost in the September 11 terrorist attacks brought actions under the ATA against al Qaeda and entities that allegedly provided support to al Qaeda. 122349 F. Supp. 2d at 779–80. Distinguishing state due process concerns from those of federal due process, the Southern District of New York held that “[t]he exercise of personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) require[d] contacts with the United States as a whole pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.” 123Id. at 810.

The next Part of this Comment discusses recent cases brought by United States plaintiffs under the ATA and the bases used by two district courts for asserting jurisdiction over common defendants, the PLO and the PA.

III. Current Cases Under the ATA

A. Factual Backgrounds

In the span of thirteen years, United States plaintiffs have filed five civil lawsuits on behalf of American family members killed abroad in Israel while vacationing or residing in the country. 124See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2015); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014); Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 583 F. Supp. 2d 451, 454−55 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The claims brought under the ATA against the PLO and the PA are under a theory of vicarious liability for aiding and abetting international terrorism. 125See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 239; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 21; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 39; Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 11; Sokolow, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 454. The plaintiffs allege that the PLO and the PA supported terrorism in and near Israel to influence United States public opinion and policy. 126See, e.g., Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41 n.6. Plaintiffs alleged that by continuing to orchestrate acts of terror against American citizens in Israel, the PA was trying to force the United States into pressuring Israel to make peaceful concessions with the PA. Id. Of the five lawsuits filed against the PLO and the PA, four were filed in the D.C. District Court. The plaintiffs chose this particular forum because the defendants have offices, conduct public relations campaigns, and fundraise nationally in Washington, D.C. 127See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 245; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 48–49. The only case not filed in the D.C. District Court was filed in the Southern District of New York. 128See Sokolow, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 451. The PLO maintains an office and an agent in New York. 129United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

The procedural history of these cases is significant because it shows the evolution of the defendants’ challenges to personal jurisdiction. In 2006, the D.C. District Court in Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Authority first determined it could exercise general personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA based on their “continuous and systematic” contacts with the United States. 13082 F. Supp. 3d at 239. In 2008, the defendants in Klieman moved to reconsider the court’s decision. 131Id. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. 132Id. In 2015, the defendants again moved for reconsideration on the personal jurisdiction rulings based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler. 133Id. This time, the court dismissed the case with prejudice in favor of the defendants. 134Id. at 250.

In Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the D.C. District Court ultimately denied defendants PLO and PA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction after twelve years of contentious litigation, holding that defendants failed to assert their jurisdictional defense—not being “at home” in the forum—when such a defense first became available under Goodyear. 135An interesting question exists as to whether defendants in these ATA cases should have been tipped off to a new standard of general jurisdiction after Goodyear. See Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (“In Goodyear . . . the Supreme Court made crystal clear that a foreign defendant’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough to support’ general jurisdiction unless that activity is so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 927 (2011))). The D.C. District Court asserted that Defendants waived their right to assert their jurisdictional defense by failing to file a motion to dismiss in 2011 when Goodyear announced the “at home” standard. Id. By waiting to file their motion to dismiss two and a half years after Goodyear, and relying on Daimler as intervening change in the law, the D.C. District Court in Gilmore held that defendants had forfeited their jurisdictional defense. Id. at 17. But see 7 W. 57th St. Realty Co. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 13 CIV. 981 PGG, 2015 WL 1514539, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (holding that Daimler marked an intervening change in the law and thus made available a previously unavailable personal jurisdiction defense).

In Klieman, the D.C. District Court had previously denied the PA’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction up until Daimler. 136Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 241. After Daimler, the D.C. District Court granted the PA’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that neither the PLO nor the PA was “at home” in the United States. 137Id. at 246; see also Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015). Finally, in Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization, the Southern District Court of New York denied defendants PLO and PA’s motions for dismissal and summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that defendants were, in fact, “at home” in the United States. 138No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014). All of these five cases are currently up for appeal. 139See supra note 5.

B. Federal District Court Split on the Issue of General Jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA

A split between the D.C. District Court and the Southern District Court of New York has emerged on whether jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA is proper in light of Daimler. 140Compare Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (holding jurisdiction over defendants was proper), with Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (holding jurisdiction over defendants was not proper). The D.C. District Court maintains the position that jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA is improper under Daimler because the PLO and the PA are not “at home” in the United States. 141See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 246; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 29; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 48 (all holding that personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA was unconstitutional in light of Daimler). The D.C. District Court denied one personal jurisdiction challenge in Gilmore, holding that the defendants waived the right to assert this defense when it first became available after Goodyear. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. The D.C. District Court held the relevant forum for assessing personal jurisdiction was the United States, but did not find the PLO or the PA to have sufficient contacts with the United States so as to render the organizations “at home” in the United States. 142See infra note 172 and accompanying text.

Conversely, the Southern District of New York in Sokolow ruled that personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA was proper not only under Daimler, but also under another case decided within the Second Circuit, Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li. 143Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014); Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2. In Gucci, the Second Circuit reiterated Daimler’s holding, but made reference to certain instances, or “exceptional case[s],” whereby Daimler’s framework may be inapplicable. 144See Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135 (“Aside from an ‘exceptional case’ . . . a corporation is at home (and thus subject to general jurisdiction, consistent with due process) only in a state that is the company’s formal place of incorporation or its principal place of business.” (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 & n.19 (2014))); Fed. Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (holding that no exceptional case existed for a defendant corporation that was not incorporated in Massachusetts and did not have its principal places of business there); see also supra note 94 (discussing the idea of an exceptional case). The Southern District of New York determined that the plaintiff’s lawsuit in Sokolow was an “exceptional case” of the kind Daimler and Gucci specifically reference. 145Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2. The court held that because defendants were not foreign corporations, they could not be subject to a personal jurisdiction analysis that based jurisdiction on their place of incorporation or principal place of business. 146Id. Thus, the court determined that jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA was constitutional under both Daimler and Gucci based on defendants’ “continuous and systematic business and commercial contacts within the United States” as a whole. 147Id. at *2. The court noted that “ATA litigation often involves foreign individuals and entities, and thereby, a statutory cause of action for international terrorism exists. There is a strong inherent interest of the United States and Plaintiffs in litigating ATA claims in the United States.” Id. at *2 n.1.

The D.C. District Court’s application of Daimler to ATA cases differs from that of the Southern District of New York’s. 148See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49 (D.D.C. 2015). Although both districts cite Daimler as precedent, they come out differently on the law. 149The Southern District of New York takes the position that under Daimler, personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA is proper. The D.C. District Court disagrees. See supra notes 140–41. According to the D.C. District Court, the Southern District of New York misinterpreted the question Daimler poses and incorrectly placed the jurisdictional burden on defendants to assert a home outside the United States, which they could not do. 150See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 246; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 49. For a discussion on the issue of which party carries this burden, see Freer, supra note 107. Since defendants could not articulate a place where they were “more at home” than the United States, the Southern District of New York concluded that general jurisdiction over the defendants was proper. 151Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395 at *2. The PLO identified various contacts outside of the United States, such as “several embassies, missions and delegations that were larger than the PLO Delegation [in the United States].” Id. The PLO still concludes “that the PLO is not at home in any one of those countries, nor does the PLO make such a claim.” Id.

IV. Daimler Is the Incorrect Standard to Apply to Cases Brought Under the ATA

This Part discusses why Daimler’s holding does not apply to the recent cases brought under the ATA. First, section A describes how Daimler only discussed what constitutes being “at home” for individuals and corporations, categories of which the PLO and the PA do not belong. Section B explains that Daimler answered a question about the personal jurisdiction limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 152See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (“The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint.”). This distinction matters because, as section C demonstrates, personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA in cases brought under the ATA should be analyzed under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Finally, section D discusses the United States’ strong federal interest in adjudicating ATA claims in its courts. Section D also argues that important policy considerations would be overlooked if Daimler controlled the jurisdictional issues in ATA cases.

A. Daimler Only Illustrates the Law for Individuals and Corporations

As mentioned in Part I.A.2, Daimler provided two illustrations for when a defendant is “at home” in the forum and thus subject to general jurisdiction. 153See Part I.A.2. For an individual, it is his or her domicile; 154Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. for a corporation, it is the corporation’s place of incorporation and the principal place of business. 155Id. The Court did not suggest or provide a framework for identifying where any other type of entity may be subject to general jurisdiction. 156Id. at 761–62 (expressing its concern with allowing “exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction”).

Daimler stands for the proposition that out-of-state corporations should be immune from suit in the United States unless they are “at home” in the United States. 157Stephen B. Kinnaird et al., Supreme Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman Limits General Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies, 53 Infrastructure (Spring 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ infrastructure/2013-14/spring/supreme_court_daimler_ag_v_bauman_limits_general_jurisdiction_over_ foreign_companies.html. The PLO and the PA, however, are not out-of-state corporations. 158See, e.g., Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49 (D.R.I. 2002). The PA is considered a non-sovereign government entity that is controlled by the PLO, a political organization. 159Id. District courts have previously treated both groups as unincorporated associations. 160It has been determined that the PLO fits the bill of an unincorporated association because “[i]t is composed of individuals, without a legal identity apart from its membership, formed for specific objectives.” Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed, 739 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); see Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 467 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113−14 (D.D.C. 2006). Therefore, even if this characterization is accurate, Daimler makes no mention of how to treat such entities. 161See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. Assuming, arguendo, that Daimler applies to the cases brought under the ATA, the D.C. District Court has nonetheless expanded Daimler’s holding to include an assessment of where a non-sovereign government entity, treated as an unincorporated association, is “at home.” 162The District Court for the District of Columbia likens the application of the Daimler/Goodyear framework in these cases to the application in another case within its circuit, Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2014). According to the Toumazou court, the plaintiff’s allegations indicated that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was a democratic republic, unrecognized by the United States, and was “at home” in Northern Cyprus, not the District of Columbia. Id. at 15. The Safra court analogized the PA to the TRNC, claiming that because the plaintiff’s allegations in Safra were premised on the PA’s control over a religious site in the West Bank, the PA was therefore “at home” in the West Bank. Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015). Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Safra never tried to make a prima facie showing that the PA was “at home” in the District of Columbia. See id.

B. Daimler Is a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Case

Daimler involved a foreign plaintiff who sued a foreign defendant in California based on foreign conduct. 163See supra Part I.A.2. In light of those facts, the Court answered the question of whether general jurisdiction over Daimler in California was proper. 164Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. In determining it was not, the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 165See supra note 67 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part I.A., the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause serves as a check on the states to ensure one state does not encroach upon the power of another state. 166See supra Part I.A.Daimler did not consider whether the federal government has the power to assert jurisdiction over a foreign entity under the Fifth Amendment.

The five cases brought in federal district court under the ATA specifically require federal courts to address whether the federal government has the power to assert jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA under the Fifth Amendment. 167See e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) (“‘Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is “consistent with the Constitution” for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2) depends on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’ . . . Accordingly, the inquiry in this case is whether the Palestinian Authority has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.” (quoting Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). None of these cases require the courts to determine whether the PLO and the PA are “at home” in either the District of Columbia or New York.

In Safra, Livnat, and Klieman, the D.C. District Court applied the Goodyear/Daimler Fourteenth Amendment framework to federal cases concerning the Fifth Amendment. 168See supra note 148. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the D.C. District Court stated that prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, courts within the D.C. Circuit exercised general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if its “contacts with the District [were] so continuous and systematic that it could [have] foresee[n] being haled into a court in the District of Columbia.” 169Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 242 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting AGS Int’l Servs. S.A. v. Newmont USA Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2004)). But rather than ask whether defendants PLO and PA could now be considered “at home” in the District of Columbia, per Daimler and Goodyear, the D.C. District Court asked whether the PLO and the PA were “at home” in the United States. 170See, e.g., id. at 245. By assessing defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole, the D.C. District Court implicitly agreed that the relevant jurisdictional inquiry was under the Fifth Amendment, yet nonetheless applied a Fourteenth Amendment framework to arrive at its conclusion. 171See Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The only question is how to properly apply this standard to an organization like the Palestinian Authority, not whether the ‘essentially at home’ standard is the correct standard.”).

C. Pre-Daimler, District Courts Asserted General Jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA Under the Fifth Amendment

Prior to Daimler, every federal court that examined whether the PLO and the PA have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole to satisfy due process under the Fifth Amendment has concluded they do. 172See Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014) (holding that “[t]his Court . . . agree[d] with every federal court to have considered the issue that the totality of activities in the United States by the PLO and the PA justifie[d] the exercise of general personal jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 229 F.R.D. 65, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179–80 (D.D.C. 2004); Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91 (D.R.I. 2001). In Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, two American plaintiffs brought actions under the ATA against the PLO and the PA for involvement in a school bus bombing in the Gaza Strip. 173310 F. Supp. 2d at 175–76.

The D.C. District Court concluded that it had general jurisdiction over both the PLO and the PA because both entities had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. 174Id. at 179. In determining the PA had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States, the court found that the PA maintains offices and agents in the United States, conducts extensive activities within the United States, has employed lobbying groups in the United States, and had entered into a contract with a United States IT corporation. Id. at 179–80. Likewise, in Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority, administrators of the Ungars’ estates brought an action under the ATA against the PLO and the PA. 175153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.R.I. 2001). Concluding that jurisdiction was proper, the Rhode Island District Court determined both defendants had minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. 176Id. at 91. Although the D.C. District Court acknowledged that cases brought under the ATA should be analyzed under Fifth Amendment Due Process standards, 177See supra note 167 and accompanying text. it nonetheless failed to follow its own precedent in light of Daimler. The D.C. District Court mistakes the fundamental principles of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process jurisprudence with those of the Fifth Amendment, which in turn has drastic effects on the outcome of plaintiffs’ cases.

Both the D.C. District Court and Southern District of New York allow a case that cites Fourteenth Amendment Due Process considerations to control their holdings in Fifth Amendment ATA cases. By citing Daimler as controlling law in Sokolow, Klieman, Safra, Livnat, and Gilmore, both the D.C. District Court and the Southern District of New York conflate the federal government’s power under the Fifth Amendment with that of the state’s under the Fourteenth Amendment. 178For a discussion on the reasons why the due process limitations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be viewed separately, see Perdue, supra note 20, at 456–70. Although the Southern District of New York in Sokolow ultimately held that general jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA was constitutional, the court arrived at its conclusion through Daimler. 179Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014). By determining the PLO and the PA could not identify any other place where it was “‘at home’ based on greater business and commercial activities than are conducted in the United States,” the court determined that general jurisdiction was thus proper. 180Id. Still imputing Daimler’s “at home” language into its analysis, the Sokolow court ruled that the record in the case was “insufficient to conclude that [the PLO or the PA] was ‘at home’ in a particular jurisdiction other than the United States.” 181Id.

To alleviate this confusion, the D.C. District Court and Southern District of New York should have implemented a more traditional Fifth Amendment national contacts approach to their analysis. 182See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. An assessment of whether a defendant’s national contacts with the United States are sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to justify the assertion of jurisdiction should be the focus of the national contacts approach under the Fifth Amendment. 183See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). An additional consideration should be whether the forum is fair and reasonable. 184DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“The fifth amendment requires only that the forum be a fair and reasonable place at which to compel the defendant’s appearance, and that he have notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”). The D.C. District Court and Southern District of New York never should have mentioned Daimler, except to state that it does not control the application of personal jurisdiction over defendants in ATA cases. This approach not only would have set the record straight for future district courts faced with these jurisdictional questions, but it also would have given due weight to the policy considerations underlying ATA cases.

D. Policy Considerations

The United States holds a strong interest in granting victims of international terrorism the chance to litigate their civil claims in court. 185See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[B]oth the Executive and Legislative Branches have expressly endorsed the concept of suing terrorist organizations in federal court.” (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991))). The legislative history of the ATA reveals just how strong that interest is. 186Although Congress acknowledged that “[e]nactment of the bill would marginally increase the number of cases in U.S. District Courts,” it was still important to “allow any U.S. national injured in his person, property, or business by an act of international terrorism to bring a civil action in a U.S. District Court.” Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040, at 5, 9 (1992)). As stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report in its discussion of § 2333, the ATA was enacted to open the “courthouse door to victims of international terrorism.” 187S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 45 (1992). In particular, the case of Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed 188937 F.2d 44 (2nd Cir. 1991). was a major impetus in the statute’s drafting. 189See Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (“An essential inspiration for the ATA was a then-recent case of Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro . . . in which relatives of an individual murdered during the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship brought suit against the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . for its alleged responsibility for the hijacking.”). Up until Klinghoffer, the United States lacked a comprehensive legal response to international terrorism. 190See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 494 (“The Committee believes that there is a need for a companion civil legal cause of action for American victims of terrorism.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992))). Senator Charles Grassley, keenly aware of the jurisdictional hurdles barring a robust legal response to international terrorism, reintroduced the ATA to provide victims with the necessary legal tools. See 137 Cong. Rec. S4511-04 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and it empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation, including: [s]ubpoenas for financial records, banking information, and shipping receipts—this bill provides victims with the tools necessary to find terrorists’ assets and seize them.”).Klinghoffer involved a terrorist attack aboard a cruise ship in international waters. 191Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 46. At the time, the sole reason the United States was able to assert jurisdiction over defendant PLO was because of maritime law. 192See H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (“Only by virtue of the fact that the [Klinghoffer] attack violated certain Admiralty laws and the organization involved—the Palestinian Liberation Organization—had assets and carried on activities in New York, was the court able to establish jurisdiction over the case. . . . In order to facilitate civil actions against such terrorists the Committee recommends [this bill].”). After Klinghoffer, Congress acted to ensure United States citizens were able to seek redress in their own country’s courts by opening the doors to jurisdiction as widely as possible under the Fifth Amendment. 193See Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Alan Kreczko) (“[F]ew terrorist organizations are likely to have cash assets or property located in the United States that could be attached and used to fulfill a civil judgment. The existence of such a cause of action, however, may deter terrorist groups from maintaining assets in the United States, from benefitting from investments in the U.S. and from soliciting funds within the U.S.”).

Applying Daimler’s “at home” standard to cases under the ATA would virtually ensure that victims of international terrorism never achieve civil justice in United States courts. The ATA cases, unlike Daimler, all involve United States plaintiffs. 194See supra Part IV.B. Under Daimler, it would be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to show that any organization which funds or supports terrorism abroad is “at home” in the United States. Should Daimler control Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns brought under the ATA, the very purpose of the ATA’s enactment would go unfulfilled. A complete obstruction of the ATA’s legislative intent in favor of Daimler’s “at home” standard is an extreme, but ultimately undeniable, consequence of the D.C. District Court’s decision in Safra, Livnat, and Klieman. Although the court came out the other way in Sokolow regarding whether the PLO the PA are “at home” in the United States, the Southern District of New York still cited Daimler in its application. 195Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014) (“Under a post-Daimler and Gucci analysis, this court has personal jurisdiction . . . .”). The danger to the ATA’s future in Sokolow comes from the court’s application of Daimler. The Sokolow court implied that if the PLO could identify any other country in which it is “‘at home’ based on greater business and commercial activities than are conducted in the United States,” then jurisdiction in the United States would no longer be proper. 196Id.

To avoid complete destruction of the ATA, future courts should examine the issue by applying a due process analysis that respects and upholds Congress’s intent in forming the statute. 197See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333 (2012). There is little sense, legislative or otherwise, in creating a claim if jurisdiction does not go with it. Although the ATA should not be used to assert jurisdiction over defendants who have no contacts with the United States, it should be allowed to serve as the basis for jurisdiction so long as the defendant has “continuous and systematic contacts” with the United States. 198See supra note 43 and accompanying text; Part I.A.

Conclusion

Applying Daimler to cases brought under the ATA will eventually eviscerate the federal statute. United States plaintiffs whose lives have been affected by terrorism deserve to have their day in court. The ATA guarantees them that right. Defendants in a court of law are also guaranteed a right: the right to due process. This Comment suggests an approach to cases of general jurisdiction brought under the ATA in which neither right is compromised.

Post-Daimler, the federal district courts’ approach to general jurisdiction cases brought under the ATA has conflated the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment Due Process considerations. 199See supra Part IV.B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process considerations should apply to cases in which there is a state-specific claim, whereas Fifth Amendment Due Process considerations should apply where federal interests are at stake. 200See supra Part I.A and B. Cases brought under the ATA are of federal concern, and thus a defendant’s right to due process in these cases should be assessed under the Fifth Amendment. Daimler was not a Fifth Amendment case. 201See supra Part IV.B. As such, its inapplicability to cases brought under the ATA by United States plaintiffs cannot be overstated.

Courts can readily adopt a consistent approach to assessing jurisdictional issues in ATA cases. The first step in doing so requires that Livnat, Safra, and Klieman be overturned on appeal. The second step requires that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirm the Southern District of New York’s decision in Sokolow. The final step involves the articulation of a clearly delineated approach for assessing personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment. Such an approach should assess whether defendants have such “continuous and systematic” contacts or business activities with the United States as a whole to render jurisdiction in the United States proper. The PLO and the PA have already satisfied that test based on their contacts and activities in the District of Columbia and New York. 202See supra Part IV.C. Adhering to the test of “continuous and systematic” contacts with the United States nationwide in ATA cases will not only provide clarity to this area of the law, but will also advance the goals of United States federal policy.

Footnotes

118 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339 (2012).

2See id. § 2333 (“Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”); see also Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (D. Utah 2006) (“The Anti-Terrorism Act . . . evinces Congress’s intent ‘to codify general common law tort principles and to extend civil liability for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort law.’” (quoting Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002))).

3136 Cong. Rec. 26717 (1990); Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 101st Cong. 133 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Professor Wendy Collins Perdue).

4See Hearing, supra note 3, at 78–79 (testimony of Joseph A. Morris).

5See, e.g., Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-7034 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-7024 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-7025 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2015); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014); Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-3151 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2014). The plaintiffs in these cases asserted civil claims against the PLO or the PA on behalf of family members killed, or seriously injured, as a result of terrorist attacks in Israel.

6Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).

7Compare Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (holding that jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA was not proper under Daimler), with Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (holding that jurisdiction was proper under Daimler).

8See Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 8187951, at *1, *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying defendant’s challenge to the court’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction because defendants failed to assert the defense when it first became available in 2011 after Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)). Compare Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250, Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 25, and Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 49 (cases holding that personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA was no longer constitutional, per Daimler), with Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (holding that defendants waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to assert it in their original motion to dismiss).

9See, e.g., Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2.

10This Comment expresses no opinion on the plaintiffs’ factual arguments in these cases. It solely identifies and discusses a personal jurisdiction split among federal district courts.

11Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see infra Part IV.A.

12See infra Part IV.A; see also Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 44 (describing the PA as a non-sovereign government entity).

13See infra Part IV.B.

14Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (“The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint.” (emphasis added)).

15Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).

16See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish For: Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 Emory L. J. Online 2001, 2002 (2014).

17The relevant inquiry faced by both the D.C. District Court and the Southern District of New York was whether defendants PLO and PA had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 244 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 43; Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).

18See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

19See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 14–16 (1987) (highlighting the failure of the federal courts to close the gap in this area of the law).

20See Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455, 456 (2004).

21See id. (arguing that jurisdiction over foreign defendants under the Fifth Amendment should be constitutional solely on the basis of effects in the United States, without a requirement of “purposeful availment”).

22Personal Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

23See Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2003 (noting that International Shoe first authorized these forms of personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts).

24Id.

25See Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure § 2.4 (3d ed. 2012).

26See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (holding that a Philippine mining corporation was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio where it carried on “a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business”).

27See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“[B]efore a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice to the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There also must be a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of summons.”). For an analytical framework for assessing personal jurisdiction, see Freer, supra note 25, at § 2.6.

28See Joseph W. Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples and Explanations 25−26 (6th ed. 2008) (“The due process clause does not actually confer any jurisdiction on state courts; it only defines the outer bounds of permissible jurisdictional power. . . . It is up to the legislature of each state to actually grant the power . . . through jurisdictional statutes.”); Luther L. McDougal, III, Robert L. Felix & Ralph U. Whitten, American Conflicts Law 75 (5th ed. 2001) (“[I]f process is to be constructively served outside a state on a defendant, there must be special statutory authorization for the service.”).

29Glannon, supra note 28, at 25.

30See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (describing the specific problem Rule 4(k)(2) was meant to address).

31See generally 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.1 (4th ed. 2015).

32J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011).

33See Perdue, supra note 20, at 456 (“The Supreme Court has never squarely considered what limits the Fifth Amendment imposes on assertions of personal jurisdiction in federal court.”); see also Welkowitz, supra note 19, at 1–2 (remarking on the lack of federal case law on this topic).

34The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. With emphasis on the states, the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

35Compare Perdue, supra note 20, at 457 (arguing that the limits imposed by the Fifth Amendment are not comparable to those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment), with Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing the fact that the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases have not interpreted the Fifth Amendment is of little significance because the Court has interpreted the two clauses as imposing similar restraints).

36Wright, Miller & Steinman, supra note 31, at § 1068.1, at 699 (“When a federal court adjudicates a federal question claim, it exercises the sovereign power of the United States and no federalism problem is presented. The Fourteenth Amendment function of protecting the several states’ status as coequal sovereigns seemingly ought to be of no relevance to the parallel analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).

37See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 Wash. U. L.Q. 1291, 1292 (1983).

38Perdue, supra note 20, at 457. The Court in Pennoyer v. Neff first articulated the importance of state sovereignty to a personal jurisdiction analysis. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1877).

39326 U.S. 310 (1945).

40Id. at 320.

41Id.

42Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

43Id. at 317. Although International Shoe was a case of specific jurisdiction, its framework has been applied to both specific and general jurisdiction cases. Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2003. In the forty years after International Shoe, the Court only decided two general jurisdiction cases and applied the same test it had used to decide cases of specific jurisdiction (i.e. “continuous and systematic contacts”). In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., the Court found the defendant had carried out “continuous and systematic” business activities in the forum state and was thus subject to jurisdiction in that state. 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952). In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Court held one trip taken to the forum state by an executive officer did not constitute “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state and could not support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant. 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).

44Welkowitz, supra note 19, at 3; Walter H. Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International Terrorism, 3 San Diego Int’l L.J. 1, 7 (2002) (discussing how the fairness factors may weigh in favor of courts asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants).

45See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980) (determining whether a corporate automobile wholesaler and retailer defendant had such minimum contacts with the state of Oklahoma so as to be subject to suit in Oklahoma).

46Id. at 294 (“[E]ven if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”). World-Wide Volkswagen involved a tragic car explosion that occurred in Oklahoma as the plaintiffs drove through the state on their way to Arizona. Id. at 288. The plaintiffs sued the car’s wholesaler and retailer in Oklahoma. Id. The Court held that jurisdiction over the defendants in Oklahoma was improper because the defendants did not conduct activity in Oklahoma and did not purposefully avail themselves of any privileges or benefits of Oklahoma law. Id. at 299.

47Id. at 291–92.

48Id. at 297.

49Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).

50Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen provided five factors to help evaluate whether asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant is fair: (1) “the burden on the defendant”; (2) “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute”; (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief”; (4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (5) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Freer, supra note 25, at § 2.4, at 88 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

51World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).

52Id. at 297 (“The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws’ gives a degree of predictability to the legal system . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011).

53See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481–82 (1985) (holding that the limits on state power under the Fourteenth Amendment are designed to protect individuals by providing them with fair notice that their activities will render them liable to suit in a particular forum).

54For a discussion on Goodyear and Daimler’s shortcomings, see Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2005–15.

55Id. at 2002.

56Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011).

57 Id.

58Id.

59Id. at 919–20 (citations omitted).

60Id. at 929 (emphasis added).

61Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).

62Id. at 919.

63Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).

64Id. at 748.

65Id.

66 Id. at 762.

67Id. at 751 (emphasis added).

68Id.

69Id. The Court relied upon its instruction in Goodyear in determining Daimler was not “at home” in California. Id.

70See id. at 761–62.

71Id. at 762 n.20 (“General jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”). See Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2005. Professors Arthur and Freer also point out how Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Daimler, utterly disregards the “fairness” factors of International Shoe, indicating the “fairness factors” have nothing to do with general jurisdiction. Id. at 2004–05.

72Domicile is defined as “[t]he place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as . . . [his] true, fixed, principal, and permanent home . . . .” Domicile, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 22.

73Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (citations omitted).

74See Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014), (“Defendants by their own admission are not foreign corporations and therefore are not subject to the traditional analysis of determining a defendant’s place of incorporation or principal place of business.”); Arthur & Freer, supra note 16, at 2005.

75Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 100 (1987).

76See Perdue, supra note 20, at 460 n.34 (“The Supreme Court has never decided what limits the Fifth Amendment might impose with respect to personal jurisdiction.”).

77See Marilyn J. Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 285, 313–14; Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 967, 986 (1961).

78Compare Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 291 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding personal jurisdiction over West German manufacturer could not be founded on his aggregated contacts with United States), with Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (“[T]he appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court where the suit is based upon a federally created right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth Amendment.”) . For a comprehensive overview on whether the scope of United States judicial authority is parallel to, or broader than, the scope of individual state authority, see generally Perdue, supra note 20.

79See, e.g., Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The proper inquiry is not . . . whether a defendant’s contacts ‘in the aggregate are extensive.’” (citation omitted)); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to aggregate national contacts); Superior Coal Co v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418–20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (rejecting a national contacts theory).

80See, e.g., Eng’g Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (identifying that a foreign defendant can rarely prefer one district over another); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) (holding that the Utah District Court could consider the aggregate presence of the defendant alien’s business in the United States as a whole).

81Harvard Law Review Assoc., Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 470, 475 (1981).

82Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (1985); cf. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”).

83Wright, Miller & Steinman, supra note 31, at § 1068.1, at 694.

84Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).

85Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (the Court failed to decide a Fifth Amendment issue); Omni Capital Int’l. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987).

86480 U.S. 102 (1987).

87Id. at 105–06.

88Id. at 108. While the Court remained divided on the question of whether the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied by the stream of commerce theory articulated by the California Supreme Court, eight Justices agreed that asserting jurisdiction over Asahi would violate fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 116.

89Id.

90Id. at 113 n.* (“We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.”).

91Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987).

92Id. (“‘We have no occasion’ to consider the constitutional issues raised by this theory.” (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.*)).

93See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 Ind. L.J. 1, 34 (1982) (“[A]s to foreign affairs . . . there are acknowledged ‘differences between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs’” (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936))); Perdue, supra note 20, at 460–61 (noting that in the international law context, the burdens and state interest should be analyzed differently than in the interstate context).

94J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite relationship with the United States Government but not with the government of an individual State. That would be an exceptional case[] . . . .”); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1985); Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co, 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984).

95See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–14 (holding that in order to determine whether jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable under the Fifth Amendment, the Court must weigh the burden on the defendant in litigating in the forum, the federal interest in the litigation, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief); Perdue, supra note 20, at 468–70.

96Perdue, supra note 20, at 469 (“[S]tatute[s] should be afforded substantial weight as a legislative articulation of federal social policy.” (quoting Wright, Miller & Steinman, supra note 31, at § 1068.1, at 625)).

97See supra Part I.

98See supra Part I (discussing the implication of Rule 4(k)(2)).

99See Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 239 (D.R.I. 2004) (quoting Hearing, supra note 3, (testimony of Joseph A. Morris)).

100Fed. R. Civ. P 4(k)(2) (“Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”).

101Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 92 (D.R.I. 2001) (first citing United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 1999); then citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)).

102Federal Rule 4(k)(2) “fill[s] a gap in the enforcement of federal law for courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants with sufficient contacts with the United States generally, but insufficient contacts with any one state in particular.” Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note).

103Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

104Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

10518 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012).

106Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

107See Freer supra note 25, at 157 & nn.77–78. Some courts require the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state. Id. The majority of courts, however, shift the burden to the defendant and require the defendant to identify any state in which he would be subject to personal jurisdiction. Id.

108See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11. The D.C. Circuit adopted the view employed by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that “so long as a defendant does not concede to jurisdiction in another state, a court may use 4(k)(2) to confer jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 651 (5th Cir. 2004)).

109See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2015); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2014); Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).

110See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11 (“Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution turns on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole to satisfy due process.”).

111Id.

112In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

113See supra Part I.

114See, e.g., Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11; Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 248 (D.R.I. 2004).

115E.g., Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11 (“Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is ‘consistent with the Constitution’ for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2) depends on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 87.

116See United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306 (1914) (holding that the constitutional barriers that border the states and keep them from infringing on the rights of other states do not apply to the United States government, which has broader powers by virtue of its sovereignty); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 Hastings L.J. 799, 818 (1988) (“Constitutional authority is premised on sovereign territorial power over the defendant through his contacts with the nation.”).

117E.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2010); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1334–36 (2006); In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 806–07.

118755 F. Supp. 2d at 18.

119Id. at 33 (“The alleged jurisdictional fact that BOC does extensive business in the United States through its own branches supports a finding of general personal jurisdiction.”).

120Morris, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.

121Id. at 1335−36 (“In terrorism cases, courts have employed the ‘effects doctrine’ to establish the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, ‘jurisdiction may attach if the defendant’s conduct is aimed at or has an effect in the forum.’” (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998))).

122349 F. Supp. 2d at 779–80.

123Id. at 810.

124See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2015); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014); Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 583 F. Supp. 2d 451, 454−55 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

125See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 239; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 21; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 39; Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 11; Sokolow, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 454.

126See, e.g., Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41 n.6. Plaintiffs alleged that by continuing to orchestrate acts of terror against American citizens in Israel, the PA was trying to force the United States into pressuring Israel to make peaceful concessions with the PA. Id.

127See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 245; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 48–49.

128See Sokolow, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 451.

129United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

13082 F. Supp. 3d at 239.

131Id.

132Id.

133Id.

134Id. at 250.

135An interesting question exists as to whether defendants in these ATA cases should have been tipped off to a new standard of general jurisdiction after Goodyear. See Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (“In Goodyear . . . the Supreme Court made crystal clear that a foreign defendant’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough to support’ general jurisdiction unless that activity is so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 927 (2011))). The D.C. District Court asserted that Defendants waived their right to assert their jurisdictional defense by failing to file a motion to dismiss in 2011 when Goodyear announced the “at home” standard. Id. By waiting to file their motion to dismiss two and a half years after Goodyear, and relying on Daimler as intervening change in the law, the D.C. District Court in Gilmore held that defendants had forfeited their jurisdictional defense. Id. at 17. But see 7 W. 57th St. Realty Co. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 13 CIV. 981 PGG, 2015 WL 1514539, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (holding that Daimler marked an intervening change in the law and thus made available a previously unavailable personal jurisdiction defense).

136Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 241.

137Id. at 246; see also Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015).

138No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).

139See supra note 5.

140Compare Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (holding jurisdiction over defendants was proper), with Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (holding jurisdiction over defendants was not proper).

141See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 246; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 29; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 48 (all holding that personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA was unconstitutional in light of Daimler). The D.C. District Court denied one personal jurisdiction challenge in Gilmore, holding that the defendants waived the right to assert this defense when it first became available after Goodyear. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

142See infra note 172 and accompanying text.

143Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014); Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2.

144See Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135 (“Aside from an ‘exceptional case’ . . . a corporation is at home (and thus subject to general jurisdiction, consistent with due process) only in a state that is the company’s formal place of incorporation or its principal place of business.” (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 & n.19 (2014))); Fed. Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (holding that no exceptional case existed for a defendant corporation that was not incorporated in Massachusetts and did not have its principal places of business there); see also supra note 94 (discussing the idea of an exceptional case).

145Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2.

146Id.

147Id. at *2. The court noted that “ATA litigation often involves foreign individuals and entities, and thereby, a statutory cause of action for international terrorism exists. There is a strong inherent interest of the United States and Plaintiffs in litigating ATA claims in the United States.” Id. at *2 n.1.

148See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49 (D.D.C. 2015).

149The Southern District of New York takes the position that under Daimler, personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA is proper. The D.C. District Court disagrees. See supra notes 140–41.

150See Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 246; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 49. For a discussion on the issue of which party carries this burden, see Freer, supra note 107.

151Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395 at *2. The PLO identified various contacts outside of the United States, such as “several embassies, missions and delegations that were larger than the PLO Delegation [in the United States].” Id. The PLO still concludes “that the PLO is not at home in any one of those countries, nor does the PLO make such a claim.” Id.

152See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (“The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint.”).

153See Part I.A.2.

154Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.

155Id.

156Id. at 761–62 (expressing its concern with allowing “exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction”).

157Stephen B. Kinnaird et al., Supreme Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman Limits General Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies, 53 Infrastructure (Spring 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ infrastructure/2013-14/spring/supreme_court_daimler_ag_v_bauman_limits_general_jurisdiction_over_ foreign_companies.html.

158See, e.g., Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49 (D.R.I. 2002).

159Id.

160It has been determined that the PLO fits the bill of an unincorporated association because “[i]t is composed of individuals, without a legal identity apart from its membership, formed for specific objectives.” Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed, 739 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); see Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 467 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113−14 (D.D.C. 2006).

161See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.

162The District Court for the District of Columbia likens the application of the Daimler/Goodyear framework in these cases to the application in another case within its circuit, Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2014). According to the Toumazou court, the plaintiff’s allegations indicated that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was a democratic republic, unrecognized by the United States, and was “at home” in Northern Cyprus, not the District of Columbia. Id. at 15. The Safra court analogized the PA to the TRNC, claiming that because the plaintiff’s allegations in Safra were premised on the PA’s control over a religious site in the West Bank, the PA was therefore “at home” in the West Bank. Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015). Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Safra never tried to make a prima facie showing that the PA was “at home” in the District of Columbia. See id.

163See supra Part I.A.2.

164Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.

165See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

166See supra Part I.A.

167See e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) (“‘Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is “consistent with the Constitution” for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2) depends on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’ . . . Accordingly, the inquiry in this case is whether the Palestinian Authority has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.” (quoting Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).

168See supra note 148.

169Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 242 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting AGS Int’l Servs. S.A. v. Newmont USA Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2004)).

170See, e.g., id. at 245.

171See Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The only question is how to properly apply this standard to an organization like the Palestinian Authority, not whether the ‘essentially at home’ standard is the correct standard.”).

172See Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014) (holding that “[t]his Court . . . agree[d] with every federal court to have considered the issue that the totality of activities in the United States by the PLO and the PA justifie[d] the exercise of general personal jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 229 F.R.D. 65, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179–80 (D.D.C. 2004); Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91 (D.R.I. 2001).

173310 F. Supp. 2d at 175–76.

174Id. at 179. In determining the PA had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States, the court found that the PA maintains offices and agents in the United States, conducts extensive activities within the United States, has employed lobbying groups in the United States, and had entered into a contract with a United States IT corporation. Id. at 179–80.

175153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.R.I. 2001).

176Id. at 91.

177See supra note 167 and accompanying text.

178For a discussion on the reasons why the due process limitations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be viewed separately, see Perdue, supra note 20, at 456–70.

179Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).

180Id.

181Id.

182See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.

183See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).

184DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“The fifth amendment requires only that the forum be a fair and reasonable place at which to compel the defendant’s appearance, and that he have notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”).

185See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[B]oth the Executive and Legislative Branches have expressly endorsed the concept of suing terrorist organizations in federal court.” (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991))).

186Although Congress acknowledged that “[e]nactment of the bill would marginally increase the number of cases in U.S. District Courts,” it was still important to “allow any U.S. national injured in his person, property, or business by an act of international terrorism to bring a civil action in a U.S. District Court.” Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040, at 5, 9 (1992)).

187S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 45 (1992).

188937 F.2d 44 (2nd Cir. 1991).

189See Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (“An essential inspiration for the ATA was a then-recent case of Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro . . . in which relatives of an individual murdered during the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship brought suit against the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . for its alleged responsibility for the hijacking.”).

190See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 494 (“The Committee believes that there is a need for a companion civil legal cause of action for American victims of terrorism.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992))). Senator Charles Grassley, keenly aware of the jurisdictional hurdles barring a robust legal response to international terrorism, reintroduced the ATA to provide victims with the necessary legal tools. See 137 Cong. Rec. S4511-04 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and it empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation, including: [s]ubpoenas for financial records, banking information, and shipping receipts—this bill provides victims with the tools necessary to find terrorists’ assets and seize them.”).

191Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 46.

192See H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (“Only by virtue of the fact that the [Klinghoffer] attack violated certain Admiralty laws and the organization involved—the Palestinian Liberation Organization—had assets and carried on activities in New York, was the court able to establish jurisdiction over the case. . . . In order to facilitate civil actions against such terrorists the Committee recommends [this bill].”).

193See Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Alan Kreczko) (“[F]ew terrorist organizations are likely to have cash assets or property located in the United States that could be attached and used to fulfill a civil judgment. The existence of such a cause of action, however, may deter terrorist groups from maintaining assets in the United States, from benefitting from investments in the U.S. and from soliciting funds within the U.S.”).

194See supra Part IV.B.

195Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014) (“Under a post-Daimler and Gucci analysis, this court has personal jurisdiction . . . .”).

196Id.

197See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333 (2012).

198See supra note 43 and accompanying text; Part I.A.

199See supra Part IV.B.

200See supra Part I.A and B.

201See supra Part IV.B.

202See supra Part IV.C.

Executive Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal; J.D., Emory University School of Law (2017); B.A., University of California, Los Angeles (2010). I am truly grateful to my faculty advisor, Professor Richard D. Freer, for his guidance and encouragement throughout the comment writing process. I would also like to thank the members of the Emory Law Journal Executive Board, particularly Molly Haren and Nathan North, for their edits and feedback. Finally, I thank my parents, Lloyd and Marcey Winawer, for their unyielding support which has always made it easy to be close to home.