Emory Law Journal

Volume 59Issue 1

Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure

Alejandro E. Camacho | 59 Emory L.J. 1 (2009)

Though legislatures and agencies are considering how to prevent further climate change, some adverse effects from a warming climate are already inevitable. Adapting to these effects is essential, but regulators and scholars have largely neglected this need. This Article evaluates the capacity of natural resource governance to cope with the effects of climate change and provides a framework for Congress to help it do so. First, it uses case studies to illustrate valuable lessons about the challenges of creating effective natural resource management. Second, the Article is anchored in the specific implications of climate change, considering the value of interagency information sharing and adaptive governance in addressing climate effects. Third, it engages the growing theoretical literature on adaptive management and federalism. Finally, it provides insight on how agencies can manage uncertainty that has far-reaching implications for other areas of administrative regulation.

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Worse Than Exemption

J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, Stephen E. Shay | 59 Emory L.J. 79 (2009)

Customary international law recognizes that every country has the right to impose both source-based taxation on income earned within its borders by foreign persons and residence-based taxation on the worldwide income of its own residents. Thus, so far as international law is concerned, the legitimacy of these taxing rights is fully accepted, and neither of these forms of taxation represents overreaching by governments. Nevertheless, unless ameliorative steps are taken, their full exercise may produce double taxation of international income. This is because, in the absence of mitigation, international income could be subject to source-based taxation in the country where it arises and to residence-based taxation in the country where the earner is a resident. The resulting tax burden would be a material impediment to international commerce.

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Wikitruth Through Wikiorder

David A. Hoffman, Salil K. Mehra | 59 Emory L.J. 151 (2009)

How does large-scale social production coordinate individual behavior to produce public goods? In 1968, Hardin denied that the creation of public goods absent markets or the State is possible. Benkler, Shirky, Zittrain, and Lessig recently countered that the necessary coordination might emerge though social norms. However, scholars have not fully explained how this coordination is to occur. Game theorists have modeled large-scale social production as a solution to the herder problem/multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemma. But we demonstrate that the “weeding in” function reflects dynamics more accurately captured in coordination games. In this way, dispute resolution can provide a constitutive function for the community.

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