Emory Law Journal

Volume 61Issue 1

Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court

Robin Kundis Craig | 61 Emory L.J. 1 (2011)

Plurality decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court demand interpretation, especially because they tend to occur when the Court faces important but divisive legal issues. Most courts, agencies, and scholars have assumed that federal agencies are in no better position to interpret plurality decisions than the lower federal courts when confronted with a potentially precedential Supreme Court plurality decision—the agency must construe the Justices—various opinions in search of a controlling rationale.

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Police Mistakes of Law

Wayne A. Logan | 61 Emory L.J. 69 (2011)

This Article addresses something that most Americans would consider a constitutional impossibility: police officers stopping or arresting individuals for lawful behavior and courts deeming such seizures reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, thereby precluding application of the exclusionary rule.

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From Backpacks to BlackBerries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell Phone

A. James Spung | 61 Emory L.J. 111 (2011)

When the U.S. Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O., cellular phones had yet to emerge in American society and public schools.

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Reframing “Professionalism:” An Integral View of Lawyering's Lofty Ideals

Brooks A. Suttle | 61 Emory L.J. 161 (2011)

Whereas legal ethics define what every lawyer must do, legal professionalism takes on the more difficult task of defining the core values that the very best lawyers should aspire to in their practice. The legal profession is granted a certain amount of autonomy and independence by American society, and the continuing legitimacy of this social contract depends on the notion that the profession will take care to regulate itself and maintain standards of conduct commensurate with its essential function.

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