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Vulnerability Theory and The Trinity Lectures: Institutionalizing the Individual

Vulnerability Theory and The Trinity Lectures: Institutionalizing the Individual, Bristol University Press - Law, Society, Policy Series (2025).

Chapter 6 – "Institutionalizing the Individual" (excerpts)

As the preceding Chapters have emphasized, the most significant theoretical focus of Vulnerability Theory is the concept of universal embodiment. It is an embodied (and therefore vulnerable) individual who encounters the myriad and inevitably shifting circumstances and situations of life. Rather than a distinct disadvantage or weakness attributed only to some individuals or present in distinct circumstances, vulnerability should be understood as a continuum of variations that together constitute the human condition.

In addition, the Theory makes clear that the inherent dependency and limitations of the body necessitate reliance on functioning social institutions and relationships, which can foster individual resilience. Resilience is composed of social resources and relationships, which are the product of institutional policies and programs when they are responsive and adaptive to the lived realities of the vulnerable subject.

As also emphasized in the Lectures, far from being individual, variable, and particular traits or characteristics, both vulnerability (signifying our embodiment) and resilience (signifying our embeddedness) are the universal manifestations of the collective human condition. Combined, these insights form the foundation for Vulnerability Theory.

By institutionalizing the individual, we challenge the dominant legal and political narratives that prioritize individual autonomy and liberty over collective well-being. This approach brings the collective dimensions of justice into focus and mandates a broader and more inclusive conception of state responsibility, one that moves beyond merely safeguarding individual rights to actively shaping the social conditions necessary for resilience and well-being.

I. The Body

The body depicted in Vulnerability Theory is presented from an ontological or anthropical perspective, a corporeal entity that encompasses a wide and inclusive range of variations and adaptations. This distinguishes Vulnerability Theory from other critical analyses that focus on particular bodily variations, such as those concentrated on specific demographic categories or on distressed or disadvantaged social circumstances. While important in many circumstances, such specifically dedicated inquiries may risk overlooking the profound effects that distorted or problematic institutional arrangements can have on everyone in society. An analysis so limited may inspire solutions that address only the symptoms of an institutional inadequacy, while leaving untouched the underlying and more extensive structural distortions and defects.

There are advantages to initially assessing and addressing these infrastructural arrangements as they affect everyone. Such a systemic approach will often remedy (or at least alter) specific problems experienced primarily or disproportionately by subgroups of society (who may have been disproportionately affected). On the other hand, legal responses that offer mere inclusion or prohibitions against discrimination for only some can leave in place underlying inequitable and dysfunctional institutional arrangements, providing little more than an illusion of improvement.

To fully understand the implications of this universal approach to the body, we must also consider how these institutional structures interact within broader social and political frameworks.

II. The Social and Political Implications of the Universal

Building on the ontological understanding of the body and beginning with the universal or ontological body as a foundational theoretical concept would profoundly alter the focus and direction of contemporary political and legal doctrines. Challenging and displacing the long-held abstractions that have dominated these arenas, such a shift would require us to reconsider the very values and norms upon which our legal and political systems have been formed and justified. Moving away from a focus on an individualized approach to justice, we would have to define, incorporate, and accommodate the essential circumstances and requirements of the collective. This does not mean abandoning the individual. While the theoretical implication of the universal body in Vulnerability Theory certainly decenters “the individual,” by concentrating on the collective entity of all individuals, it paradoxically also brings greater clarity and attention to the physical and material conditions that form the reality of every individual. Discrediting the practicality of the idealized abstract constructs of independence and autonomy, the universal subject of Vulnerability Theory would mandate a re-envisioning of the significance of the collective (and, ultimately, governance, law, and authority). The individual would be redefined as a legal and political subject that could only be adequately understood within the institutional contexts which our embodied vulnerability and resulting social dependency require. This redefinition of political and legal subjectivity is what is meant by the phrase “institutionalizing the individual” – the individual in theory, as in life, must be placed within the complex and interrelated institutional contexts that actually define reality.

A. The Institutionalized Individual

A redefinition of the individual as inevitably embedded in social relationships and structures throughout life requires reframing questions of obligation and responsibility, as well as the mechanisms and principles for the social distribution of rewards and risks. The response of the state or the governing entity would of necessity be altered if we were to begin with the normalcy of vulnerability and dependency. Not only would problems be differently perceived, but the remedies sought would be more extensive and potentially transformative for society.

Concern with discrimination against particular individuals or groups is obviously very important, but it is also a quite different project than is the long-overdue effort to reform the conception of the universal liberal legal subject as the human avatar for legal and political theory. In a discrimination situation, the harm is a deviation from the legal mandate of equal treatment for all, not the skewed or distorted characterization of the human subject within these legal norms. Equality, in its conventional sense, is too narrow a concept to fully encompass the diverse ways in which individuals are affected by social, economic, and political forces.

However, there is a more significant problem with an analysis limited to only some in society. A primary focus on particular distinguishing categories can frustrate the search for a truly comprehensive and inclusive universal legal and political subject by deflecting attention from the societal role and functioning of institutions to the differences between individuals. With Vulnerability Theory, the inquiry should be into whether the structural arrangements established in society are responsive to the realities of the vulnerable human condition. Some important considerations include how social institutions are arranged in relation to each other and how they define and guide the institutional identities, expectations, and responsibilities of the individuals who are destined to live within them. These are among the issues that Vulnerability Theory seeks to explore, bringing social institutions and relationships firmly to the center of critical analysis.

We must remember that society’s social relationships and structures are not natural in form. They are also not static, but evolve over time, influenced by cultural, historical, and political changes, and must be continually reassessed to ensure they remain equitable and just. These institutional structures are not “natural,” but are the products of history, culture, policy, and politics, typically reinforced or compelled through law and by governing entities. The individual (as well as the politics and policies that affect the individual) should never be theorized as separate from the structural circumstances in which they are embedded.

Interestingly, the recognition of and contextualizing or institutionalizing a universal subject is also likely to provide the most extensive and practical benefits for particular individuals. State responsibility is greatly expanded beyond negative liberty models of individual rights or situations where there is a need to prevent discrimination. If our notions of state or collective (as well as individual) responsibility were shaped with a clear understanding of universal vulnerability and inevitable reliance on social institutions, state intervention would not be seen as only to be occasionally tolerated, but as necessary for individual and societal wellbeing. As a result, the position of any particular individual would be more clearly and justly assessed than it would be if they were perceived as independent and autonomous (and thus isolated and abandoned to mythical constructs of consent and contract). There are two additional important implications of Vulnerability Theory that have implications for how we understand the scope and extent of collective or governmental responsibility.

  1. Reframing the Individual within Social Structures

Since the foundational concept is the embodied individual, the template for the universally vulnerable subject would naturally span the life course, not be confined to only one stage or form of being. By contrast, the liberal legal subject is perceived as an adult, a fully functioning participant in some mythical social contract who is supposedly protected by the illusions of agency and independence. Those who fall outside of that construct are not perceived as entitled to or capable of enjoying the full benefits and protections of the preferred full legal subject. With Vulnerability Theory, the legal subject has been expanded to be inclusive of all stages and variations in the human condition. The expansion of the legal subject to encompass all stages of life underscores the need for a broader understanding of legal and political responsibilities.

  1. Implications for Legal and Political Theory

The second significant implication of the Theory also is related to the idea of an expanded legal subject but focuses on the institutional arrangements that are central in a vulnerability analysis. Bringing in various life stages highlights the naturalness of relations of inequality, such as those that exist between parent and child. While inherently unequal, such relationships are not necessarily unjust; some are even necessarily unequal. However, it should be the responsibility of the governing bodies to regulate these relationships so as to promote fairness and prevent them from becoming sites of exploitation or abuse.

Lecture Four on “inevitable inequality” showed how unequal family relationships were not unique, but exemplary of many, if not most, social arrangements. Other examples included employer/employee; doctor/patient; and landlord/tenant. Concepts of equality, contract, and consent simply do not address the ways in which these ubiquitous asymmetric arrangements should be monitored in terms of the power, options, and resources they reflect. The glorification of some mythical autonomous individual in contemporary political culture has allowed theorists and politicians to avoid the hard questions about the need for governmental action implicit in these situations of inherent institutional inequality.

B. Biological Mandates

The grounding of Vulnerability Theory in the physical body rather than resorting to aspirational abstractions is not merely a rhetorical device, but a deliberate strategy to underscore the corporeal constraints that shape our experiences, define our needs, and compel our relationships. It highlights that our vulnerabilities are not occasional or situational but constant and intrinsic, demanding ongoing and responsive engagement from both the state and society.

The mandate regarding governmental or collective responsibility that arises from this approach to what it means to be human is very different than the one that operates currently to severely curtail or constrain programs and policy measures. Liberal restraint jealously guards the individual’s autonomy and liberty. By contrast, a vulnerability approach would emphasize the biological and interactive or relation-dependent nature of the human condition. This would naturally lead to considering what governmental, social, legal, and ideological arrangements are essential for human and societal function and thriving. Such an inquiry must extend beyond material needs to encompass the emotional, psychological, and social dimensions of well-being, acknowledging that these too are critical to human flourishing. In exploring these mandates, we can see how they align with the broader social functions and roles necessary for individual and societal well-being.